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E ective governance of natural resources is a key challenge facing many developing nations. There is
general agreement that without e ective institutions, resources will be underprovided and overused. What is less
certain, however, is what these institutions might be and who ought to provide them. Should governments take
the lead in supplying institutions and organizing collective action, should this task be resolved through market
forces, or should resource users of a “common pool resource” be encouraged to take the lead? This paper
presents the view that it is di cult for external actors to design optimal institutions and enforce rules at low cost
because solutions tend to be conditional and situation speciﬁc. Therefore, local resource users are better
equipped to develop or be major participants in developing institutional solutions. Support for this idea is drawn
from empirical studies of irrigation systems in Nepal. Comparisons of the performance of farmer-managed
irrigation systems with that of agency-managed irrigation systems show that the former consistently out perform
the latter on most performance measures. This paper o ers two key insights: developing e ective institutions is
as important as developing physical infrastructure and local resource users may be able to o er better insti-
tutional solutions under certain conditions than government agencies when resources are local in scale.
: Irrigation, Governance, Common pool resource, Collective action, Natural resource management
users.
The Nepali State’s involvement in the provision
E ective governance of irrigation systems is cru- of irrigation infrastructure has been substantial.
cial to Nepal, which has predominantly an agrarian However, the performance of agency-managed irri-
economy that is dependent on irrigated paddy cul- gation systems (AMIS) is unsatisfactory relative to
tivation to feed a growing population. Year-round the resources invested in the sector (NPC, ).
irrigation is available for less than of the . Failure to provide an assured supply of water, to
million hectares of land area that could be irrigated get water to farmers at the tail end, and to achieve
(Shah and Singh, ), and therefore more e ec- economies of scale in construction, operation, and
tive irrigation could greatly expand agricultural maintenance are among the most consistently cited
production, which currently contributes of problems. Interestingly, many of these problems
the gross domestic product (Ministry of Finance, observed in AMIS are a result of poorly designed
). While there is no dispute in recognizing the institutions i.e. rules in use rather than of poorly
importance of irrigation, there are intense disagree- designed infrastructure.
ments over how irrigation infrastructure ought to Farmer-managed irrigation systems (FMIS), in
be developed and governed. Some believe that contrast, are reported to perform relatively well
governments are necessary in order to supply and (Lam, ). In a systematic study, Lam showed
organize collective action, while others believe that that FMIS outperformed AMIS on most key pa-
this task is best done by self-governed resource rameters agricultural yield, cropping intensities,
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and ability to get water to the tail end. The some state involvement but it was limited (Shah
potential of FMIS is no doubt substantial, but not and Singh, ). Chandra and Juddha Nahars
every FMIS is successful. There are some settings (canals) were among the ﬁrst public sector irriga-
where appropriators are able to self-organize suc- tion projects undertaken by the national govern-
cessfully and other settings where they are not. ment in and , respectively. State budgets
Since many variables can jointly a ect the beneﬁts were also allocated to construct and maintain a few
and costs of organization, predicting the emergence or royal canals (Regmi, ). It was
or lack of self-organization simply by looking at the only after that planned modes of irrigation
presence or absence of a set of resources and user development were initiated by the Government
attributes is not a trivial task (Ostrom, ). This through its ﬁve-year plans. Despite government
paper examines some of the attributes of and re- involvement, even today, FMIS contribute three
source settings in FMIS in Nepal to explain how times as much toward irrigated agriculture than do
they have inﬂuenced the ability of farm com- AMIS.
munities to self-organize. Such an explanation Irrigation infrastructure development from
should allow for the design of policies that can to initially focused on the construction of
strengthen institutional and governance capabilities medium- and large-scale projects. It then gradually
of FMIS. moved toward the intensiﬁcation of existing com-
The paper is organized into ﬁve parts. Part I mand areas through the expansion and rehabilita-
presents an overview of the irrigation sector and its tion of existing infrastructure. Program implemen-
performance in Nepal. Part II explores the incen- tation during this period was very centralized. Irri-
tive structures facing farmers in self-organized gation o cials assumed all planning, construction,
versus agency-managed systems and examines why operation and management, and maintenance re-
farmers in the former systems may be better sponsibilities. Beneﬁciaries were not involved.
motivated than those in the latter. Part III com- Only after did the government begin to take a
pares the performance of AMIS and FMIS. Part more integrated approach to developing land and
IV presents research results and explores how some water resources, and, unlike earlier times, more
of the attributes of resource users, attributes of emphasis began to be placed by Government on
physical resources, and resource setting can a ect user involvement in the irrigation process (Shah
cooperation and performance in self-organized sys- and Singh, ; Angood ).
tems. The conclusions and lessons that can be The policy reforms undertaken by Government
learned to improve irrigation performance are then to adopt a participatory approach to irrigation de-
presented at the end in Part V. velopment are reﬂected in documents such as the
and the updated
(Water Aid Nepal ). The
policy sets out objectives and guidelines for irriga-
Nepal has a total cultivated area of . million tion interventions, including FMIS development
hectares. Although of this area has potential and management and transfer of Department of
for irrigated agriculture, only . million hectares Irrigation (DOI)-constructed systems to water user
( ) is covered by irrigation infrastructure associations (WUAs) (Water Aid Nepal, ).
(Shah and Singh, ; NENCID, ). Surface The irrigation policy, which was initially adopted in
water is used to irrigate , ha and ground- , has explicit provisions for supporting com-
water (mainly in Terai) to irrigate , ha. munity e orts in irrigation development and for
Year-round irrigation is available to only of encouraging more user participation in agency-led
the irrigated areas. Most ( ) of the irrigated irrigation development programs. The
areas are serviced by FMIS and the remaining also provides a legal basis for
( ) by AMIS (NENCID, ). implementing participatory development programs
The vast majority of the irrigation infrastructure as it recognizes the rights of WUAs. Another
developed until the mid- s was constructed and important document is the Government’s -year
managed by farmers. During this period, there was ( ) (NPC,
raj kulos
et al.,
Water Resources Act Irriga-
tion Policy
Water Re-
sources Act
Agricultural Perspective Plan
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), which identiﬁes irrigation as the primary institutional aspect of irrigation systems and focus
input for increasing agricultural productivity and only on improving physical capital. To emphasize
recognizes FMIS as a key vehicle for delivering the her point, Ostrom cited the experience of the
input. USAID-funded Chiregad Irrigation Project in
Dang, as reported by Hilton ( ). A new irriga-
tion system with permanent headworks and
An estimated US $ . billion was spent in the cement-lined canals was constructed in an area that
irrigation sector from to (Shah and was previously irrigated by ﬁve FMIS. Making no
Singh, ). Only of this amount was e ort to understand how the pre-existing water
funded through the government’s resources; the associations were organized, DOI appointed a new
remaining was funded by external donors. user committee that failed to include any of the
The Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and water managers of the ﬁve FMIS. The outcome of
Saudi Development Fund were the major donor this intervention was that only three of the ﬁve
agencies. Nearly of these funds were spent on (villages) received water consistently.
constructing new irrigation infrastructure. Despite Prior to the intervention, all ﬁve used to
a standing policy since the mid- s to prioritize receive adequate water. The e ort to improve
the rehabilitation and expansion of FMIS net- agricultural productivity through investments in
works, the DOI has invested only about in this physical capital alone thus resulted in reduction of
area (Shah and Singh, ). the service area, unreliable water delivery, a non-
DOI investments in medium- and large-scale pro- functional WUA, and a weakened older WUA.
jects have been disappointing. Shah and Singh Institutional structures stand on social capital
( ) reported that water volumes supplied by developed over many years of learning through
many large projects such as Sunsari-Morang, shared experiences and are as real as physical capi-
Bagamti, and Narayani are far below original tal. Their neglect, as we see in this example, not
plans, and the projects consistently have capital only resulted in weakening of farmer organizations
cost over-runs. Some projects, such as Bagmati and but also led to adverse outcomes.
Babai, are reported to have cost over $ , /ha to
construct. The appraisal by the National
Planning Commission of irrigation development
performance in the country was also negative, A self-organized system can be structurally
reporting “irrigation development and operation in better at generating positive incentives than exter-
Nepal is performing dismally relative to the amount nally organized systems. In a self-organized sys-
of resources poured into the sector” (NPC, ). tem, such as the FMIS, the farmers collectively
There are many reasons for such poor perform- construct and govern their own systems. They
ance, but the ones that are more frequently make decisions on delineating service areas, deter-
reported are (a) weak governance framework and mining water allocation rules, and assigning main-
weak enforcement in attaining e ective service de- tenance responsibilities. In externally designed sys-
livery; (b) unrealistic productivity projections in tems, such as the AMIS, someone other than the
assessing beneﬁt-cost ratios; (c) poor system man- farmers designs the physical system and assumes
agement; (d) insu cient operation and manage- responsibility for making rules and enforcing them.
ment due to lack of user participation; and (e) poor Government o cials who are tasked with manag-
understanding of farmer priorities (ADB, ). ing these systems, however, have to govern on
The institutional arrangements to induce realistic shoestring budgets and with limited manpower.
project planning and e ective system management Without much incentive to develop long-term
are, obviously, weak. working relationships with the farmers and faced
Intervention by governmen t agencies to improve with resource constraints, many try to develop
FMIS has also run into di culties. Ostrom ( , simple uniform allocation rules across the board
) pointed out that these di culties often arise and often neglect to enforce them. Given the
because irrigation agencies fail to recognize the farmers’ diverse cropping schedules and needs,
maujas
maujas
Irrigation Performance
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Regmi: Self-Governance in Farmer-Managed Irrigation Systems in Nepa
such uniform rules are mostly inadequate, and,
without enforcement, the stage is set for breaking
rules. When “o cial rules” do not match local There are many individual case study reports by
needs, then conﬂicts break out, canals are breached, authors who assert that FMIS in Nepal perform
and physical capital is destroyed (Lam, ). better than AMIS. Lam ( ) undertook a sys-
In more recent times irrigation policy has en- tematic and comprehensive study of Nepali
couraged “turnover” and “joint management” of irrigation systems and reached the same conclusion.
AMIS to formal WUAs to improve irrigation oper- In the following sections, I review his results and
ations (Shivakoti and Ostrom, ). However, those of a few others to underscore Ostrom’s
very little attention tends to be given by govern- ( ) idea that self-organized resource users may
ment o cials in forming strong WUAs, and these be better able to resolve cooperation dilemmas (or
associations are often seen as arrangements by be a major part in their resolution) when resources
them to obtain a community’s cooperation. Little are local in scale. In other words, external actors
is done to either encourage or develop the govern- may face more di culties than local resource users
ing function of these organizations. O cials (pro- in designing optimal institutional solutions and en-
fessional engineers) who oversee this process are forcing rules at lower cost.
not motivated and often not skilled to serve the Lam used three measures of irrigation perform-
needs of the farmers. Engineers are more interest- ance agricultural productivity, water delivery,
ed in the construction part of the process rather and physical condition to compare performance
than in the operation and management function. between FMIS and AMIS. All of his measures are
And, institutional aspects of irrigation system composite indices derived from multiple variables.
design are often his/her weak point as it is not a Agricultural productivity attempts to capture the
strong component of engineering training. The productive potential of a group resulting from their
farmers, too, are not conﬁdent about the transfer collective action e orts. Water delivery measures
process and are unwilling to invest their time in the ability of a system to deliver water adequately,
operating the system. A tendency to shirk on the reliably, and equitably. Physical condition is a
part of the o cials as well as a tendency to free-ride measure of how well an irrigation system is being
on the part of the farmers often results in the poor maintained. Comparing FMIS and AMIS along
performance of AMIS. each of these three dimensions, Lam found that
Farmers in successful FMIS tend to overcome FMIS, on average, had higher levels of agricultural
their collective action problems by crafting their productivity, maintained their infrastructures bet-
own rules (Ostrom, ; Shivakoti and Ostrom, ter, and delivered water more e ectively than
). The conditions that are necessary to initiate AMIS. These di erences are statistically signiﬁ-
collective action, however, do not arise spontane- cant.
ously. Unless farmers have a common shared un- Two other relevant results that Lam reported are
derstanding of the costs and beneﬁts of engaging in that rule following among appropriators is sig-
collective action, unless a secure property agree- niﬁcantly greater in FMIS than AMIS, and levels of
ment regime makes it possible for them to reap the mutual trust are higher in FMIS. More than
beneﬁts of their e orts in the long run, and unless of the FMIS are characterized by high levels of rule
they are conﬁdent that external authorities will not following, but only of AMIS; rule infractions
interfere in their rule making, implementation, and are of a minor nature in out of FMIS but in
enforcement activities, farmers will not invest their out of AMIS; and farmers trust fellow farmers
e orts in organizing for the long term. Simply nearly twice as much in FMIS than in AMIS. The
turning over systems to the farmers and expecting reason why FMIS are able to perform better than
viable organizations to take root is expecting too AMIS is probably because the rules adopted by the
much. To craft rules that suit a particular environ- former are better able to distribute the beneﬁts and
ment, there has to be an understanding of the costs more equitably among the users than the
inter-relationships between the rules and the physi- latter. This is reﬂected in the higher levels of trust
cal, social, and cultural environments. and greater rule-following behavior observed in
Comparing FMIS and AMIS Performance
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organize (Ostrom ; Bromley, ; McCay
FMIS than in AMIS.
Another study by Ostrom and Gardner ( ),
based on large number of cases, also suggested that
FMIS are better able to deliver water to their tail This section draws heavily on a study of FMIS
ends than AMIS. Water is generally most abun- in Chitwan, Nepal (Regmi, ). In Chitwan,
dant in river courses during the monsoon season. there are two distinct types of river systems: north-
In spring and winter, however, water tends to be south (N-S) and east-west (E-W) ﬂowing. Rivers
scarcer. Water is the most critical agricultural that ﬂow N-S originate from the Mahabharat Hills
input for Nepali farmlands, and crop yields and and pass through changing terrain from hills to
cropping intensities are mostly a function of its plains. These rivers are characterized by steep
availability. Therefore, the ability of irrigation gradients, seasonal ﬂows, changing course, low-
systems to deliver water to their tail ends across the discharge volumes, and di cult terrain (Pradhan,
seasons is a strong indicator of irrigation perform- ). Irrigation systems drawing water from
ance. Comparing FMIS and AMIS on this meas- these rivers tend to have longer canals, pass
ure, Ostrom and Gardner ( ) found that FMIS through landslide zones, and require frequent
consistently outperforms AMIS across the seasons. maintenance of diversion structures. E-W rivers,
Their results show that three times as many FMIS on the other hand, are characterized by ﬂat terrain,
were able to provide abundant water to their tail mild gradients, perennial ﬂows, and high discharge
ends than were AMIS during winter and spring. volumes. Irrigation systems on these rivers enjoy
Studies of FMIS in Tanahu (Poudel an advantage over the other systems in the ease
) and of FMIS in Chitwan (Shukla with which appropriators can draw water. The N-S
) also indicated that FMIS are able to produce and E-W groupings reﬂect distinct resource set-
more spring paddy rice ( t/ha/y and . t/ha/y, tings. In addition, system variations occur with
respectively) than the national average ( . t/ha/ respect to group size, ethnic composition, exit op-
y). tions, in-group income di erences, and many other
The above results indicate that farmers in self- variables. Within this context, local resource users
organized irrigation systems are capable of per- have to organize and craft rules that allow them to
forming better than their counterparts in externally maintain their resources and ensure equitable re-
managed systems. This does not mean, however, source distribution.
that farmers are always successful at self-organ- Performance of an FMIS in Chitwan tends to be
ization. There is general agreement among com- strongly associated with the orientation of the river
mon pool resource scholars that appropriators who system from which it draws its water. As pointed
are dependent on a resource, intend to use their out above, the characteristics of a river system have
resources over a long time, have achieved certain a direct bearing on the amount of e ort required to
levels of trust, and possess some level of autonomy operate and maintain a system and the volume of
to make their own rules are more likely to self- resource available. This is reﬂected in the ability of
E-W irrigation systems to draw water for more
and Acheson, ). Whether they are actually months in a year, maintain their infrastructures
able to do so, however, depends on how attributes better, and enjoy higher cropping intensities.
of the resource and attributes of the users interact Whereas all E-W irrigation systems are able to take
in speciﬁc ﬁeld settings to a ect the perceived costs water for more than months of the year, only one
and beneﬁts of organizing (Ostrom, ). In the out of four N-S systems are able to do this. Also,
following section, I examine how some of the re- agricultural productivity and infrastructure in E-W
source attributes and resource user attributes may systems are better than those in N-S systems by
inﬂuence the performance of FMIS in speciﬁc re- factors of . and . , respectively.
source settings. The above results, however, do not necessarily
mean that E-W systems are better governed than
N-S systems. In fact, higher levels of rule-following
behavior are observed in N-S systems than in E-W
et al.,
et al.,
et al.,
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systems, and the di erences are signiﬁcant ( that comprise a group. The socio cultural result
. , . ). This suggests that less-well- is in line with the studies of Fujita ( ),
endowed resource systems (N-S) may be more Gautam ( ), and Somanathan ( ):
rigorous at ﬁne-tuning operational rules and follow- they too did not ﬁnd any association between their
ing them than their better-endowed counterparts. measures of socio-cultural heterogeneity and collec-
The larger implication of this result, though, is tive action. The results in income variation and size
associated with self-organization. Resource users, are similar to those of Tang ( ), Lam ( ),
even in the absence of a conducive environment, and Ternstro¨m ( ): a negative correlation be-
may be able to self-organize and develop e ective tween income inequality and collective action and
agreements when the beneﬁts of organizing are no correlation between size and collective activity.
commonly understood. One might expect better coordination and collec-
Irrigation performance was also found to be tive action when system size is small, but this
inﬂuenced by the willingness of individuals in appears not to be the case.
groups to assume leadership or entrepreneurial ac- The e ects of engineering infrastructure i.e.,
tivities and a group’s history of prior organizational the type of headwork or canal lining on irriga-
experiences. One in ﬁve E-W systems reported tion performance appear not to be uniform. The
weak leadership roles versus three in ﬁve N-S sys- presence of a sturdier and more permanent type of
tems. Similarly, some history of cooperation in headwork on a system appears to be negatively
activities other than irrigation was reported in eight correlated with performance. A sturdier cement-
of ten E-W systems versus three of ten N-S systems. lined canal, on the other hand, is positively cor-
These di erences in leadership and organizational related with system performance. Although the
activities associate positively and signiﬁcantly with results are not statistically signiﬁcant, their implica-
irrigation performance. Unless individuals are will- tions very much are. A truly permanent headwork,
ing to invest substantial amounts of their personal ironically, generates disincentives for head enders
time and energy in coordinating activities of the to cooperate with tail-enders in system maintenance
many users, it may not be possible to craft workable (Lam, ). Partial or complete cement lining, on
institutions. Making, testing, ﬁne-tuning, interpret- the other hand, appears to improve performance by
ing, and monitoring and enforcing rules to struc- minimizing water losses, thereby enabling water to
ture irrigation activities is a continuous process and reach the tail ends. The policy implications of such
requires substantial amounts time and energy. results are that improvements in engineering infra-
Ternstro¨m ( ) also reported a signiﬁcant rela- structure alone may not necessarily translate into
tionship between leadership abilities and perform- improved system performance. Unless users are
ance in her study of irrigation systems. Any type of able to craft and enforce rules that can cope with
prior organizational history is important. Familiar- the asymmetries generated by improvements in irri-
ity with various rules and strategies used to achieve gation infrastructure, the positive e ects may well
various forms of regulations make the task of or- be cancelled out by the negative e ects.
ganization a bit easier, as users are more likely to
agree upon rules whose operation they understand
from prior experience. Irrigation systems face a variety of challenges.
Results from Chitwan also indicate that there is The terrain can be di cult, rivers can be unruly,
no correlation between socio cultural di erences group members may belong to diverse cultural
as reﬂected by a group’s ethnic composition and backgrounds, group sizes can vary, asset endow-
irrigation performance; a negative correlation be- ments may di er, and interests may di er within
tween income variation and performance; and no groups. Given these constraints, an irrigation
correlation between the size of an irrigation system system has to be able to solve the fundamental
as measured by its command area and perform- problems of provisioning and appropriation as-
ance. The results suggest that variations in income sociated with common pool resources. Intakes and
within groups may be a greater impediment to canals have to be constructed and maintained regu-
self-organization than the number of ethnicities larly, and working rules have to be crafte
P et al.
et al.
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Bromley, D.W., . Making the commons work. Institute
for Contemporary Studies. San Fransisco, CA, USA.
Fujita, M., Hayami, Y. and Kikuchi, M., . The condi-
tions of collective action for local commons manage-
ment: the case of irrigation in the Philippines. Agricul-
tural Economics ( ), .
Gautam, A., . Forest land use dynamics and com-
munity-
appropriation rights and responsibilities. Such ac- if they are aware of their interdependence and see
tivities, which consume lots of energy and require mutual beneﬁts resulting from working together.
the mobilization of signiﬁcant resources, might be The presence of a set of credible, commonly under-
undertaken more e ectively by self-governed stood, well-enforced, and agreed-upon rules further
groups than by centralized government agencies. helps in generating a positive incentive system for
The arguments for government interventions are villagers to engage in collective action. Without
often based on the premises that ﬂimsy infrastruc- creating the right environment, bureaucracies can-
tures used by farmers result in waste, group di er- not assume that cooperation among resource users
ences within a community prevent farmers from will develop naturally once an irrigation system has
self-organizing, increasing group sizes and com- been handed over to them. Creating the right
mand areas make it more di cult for farmers to environment requires bureaucracy to emphasize in-
reach e ective agreements among themselves, and stitution building, engage local resource users in all
larger integrated systems result in economies of aspects of irrigation development, and ensure their
scale. Empirical results from the ﬁeld, however, legal standing. Common pool resource systems are
suggest otherwise. Despite considerable group het- coproduction processes that perform best when
erogeneity, farmers are able to organize; even with both the oversight agencies and resource users co-
ﬂimsy infrastructure, they are able to outperform operate in making the system work.
AMIS with superior infrastructure; and they are Farmers in Chitwan have been able to overcome
able to reach agreements even when group size or collective action problems and are fairly successful
command area is large. These results underscore at managing water resources in their unique set-
Ostrom’s ( , ) observation that there is a tings. This implies that, even though it is di cult,
strong institutional aspect to irrigation systems, and it is possible for resource users with a supportive
focusing only on improving physical capital may political system to locally overcome what are as-
not result in improved irrigation performance. sumed to be severe collective-action problems. If
Although FMIS potential may be substantial, not external assistance is geared toward supporting the
every FMIS is successful. Some resource settings farmers’ e orts to develop their own institutions,
tend to be more conducive to self-organization than this could result in enhanced water security and
others. Systems with di cult topography N-S improved irrigation performance.
systems face far more organizational challenges
than systems with favorable topography. However,
the abilities of groups to craft rules and their will-
ingness to monitor and enforce them can, to a great
extent, overcome the problems associated with ini-
tial resource endowments. The lack of leadership
abilities or prior organizational history, in fact, can
turn out to be more detrimental to self-organization
and irrigation performance than poor initial re-
source endowments, ethnic di erences, or even the
presence of permanent irrigation infrastructure.
Understanding how di erent variables interact in
di erent settings can help in designing policies that
can strengthen institutional and governance
capabilities of FMIS.
There are many dimensions to the basis for coop-
eration among individuals. Individual common-
pool resource users are likely to contribute and
cooperate only if they perceive that they will be able
to reap the long-term beneﬁts of engaging in collec-
tive action. They are also more likely to cooperate
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